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I. Background of the subject problem 
Ikeda Cabinet, during the course of fonnulating its new policy suddenly 
revised the figure of the annual economic growth rate of 7.2 % as set-up by 
Economic Planning Agency who had been seriously tackling the Income 
Doubling Program, to 9 % . 
Closely observing the process in which such modification was made and' 
the way the Income Doubling Program was rewritten in accordance with 
the newly set-up growth rate, we are led to believe that said modification 
was rather arbitrarily made due to their political reason. 
Be that as it may, the impact of the said revision of the economic 
growth rate could not be confined to itself; instead its repercussion cannot 
be but far reaching because the practice of their new policies such as of 
tax reduction, increased spending for public investment and social welfare 
etc. hinges largely upon whether or not their anticipated fiscal revenue be 
realized through the economic growth according to such revised rate. 
Ironical it is, the said modification of economic growth rate gives us 
an uneffaceable impression that their policies came first and to financially 
substantiate such policies they had to raise the growth rate. 
It is, however, not correct either to simply claim that said 9 % entirely 
lacks its ground, for the Income Doubling Program advocated by Ikeda 
Cabinet is supported by "Shimomura Theory". 
As it has been made public, Shimomura contends that" Japanese economy 
upto 1956 had had gross demand in excess of supply capacity and therefore 
tight money policy had, more or less, to be persued, but since 1957 the 
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University. 
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increase in production capacity resulting from the ever-increased industrial 
investment has changed the whole picture into reverse. Therefore the 
financial and monetary policy must now put greater emphasis on how to 
wisely vitalize the productive power thus enlarged, and it should avoid to 
adopt a policy that gives too much precaution against over-heating of national 
economy." With such premises, the rate of industrial investment of about 
15 % of gross national products was set from which the investment for the 
replacement of obsolete equipment was deducted and the net investment 
rate was thus figured out as 11 %. On the other hand, he found out the 
net increase of gross national products to be almost equivalent to the former 
from the statistics of 1951-1956. According to Shimomura, "the rate of 
raising the gross national products for the following year by the industrial 
investment, namely the output coefficient is approximately 1 : 1 and therefore 
the growth rate should reasonably be 11 %, though after 1957 the increase 
in gross national products had fallen short of that in industrial investment, 
hence the output coefficient has become less than 1. However since the 
production capacity is annually raised by 11 % as the result of that much 
of industrial investment, a policy of rapid economic growth in line with 
the growth rate of 11 % should be employed." Above is the outline of the 
logics advocated by Shimomura, but it has been theoretically refuted as 
to his approach to the output coefficiency as well as regarding its basis 
of calculation. 
Though his contention has been theoretically repelled the fact still re-
mains that it actually is constituting a driving force of the economic policy 
of Ikeda Cabinet. 
In this study where the economic policy is the main issue, the theoretical 
aspects of the problem is intentionally left untouched and instead the realities 
upon which the Shimomura theory is based, is further explored. 
Now, when the industrial investment is taken as an independent factor, 
the forecast of the growth of national economy tends to be too bullish. 
Theoretically speaking, however, the industrial investment is by no means 
an independent variable but has greatly to do with idle equipment and 
profit rate. However for the large enterprises who are in the midst of the 
technological innovation and whose profits are safeguarded by the fiscal and 
monetary policy, it is possible to plan a long-range production program taking 
into their account the industrial investment to their advantage. 
A large steel maker mentioned in this connection, "We are planning 
to construct two units of blast furnace, erect equipment for wide flange 
beam, hot strip and cold strip mill by 1965 with the capital investment of 
72 billion yen but we are ready to make further investment. We have now 
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a tentative plan to produce 45 million tons of iron and steel in 1970 based 
on the economic growth rate of 7.2 % but once it is raised to 9 %, much 
more production would be made possible." (Nihon Keizai Shinbun Sept. 
13) 
The large makers are capable of making full advantage of the Income 
Doubling Program of the government and as the matter of fact, the large 
iron and steel companies, for instance, are expecting, at the account closing 
for the latter half of the fiscal year, the profit by 15-20 % more than the 
previous half. 
Should this increase rate attained even during such semi-annual basis 
continues, two and half years to three years be sufficient to achieve the goal 
of "Income Doubling Program ". 
Besides it is the industrial investment of large enterprises that plays a 
vital role in bringing about so-called investment boom. According to the 
survey of the Development Bank, the industrial investment made by the 
large enterprises during 1960 was by 48 % greater than the previous year, 
while the White Paper says that during 1959 the total equipment investment 
made by 1669 companies having the capital of more than 100 million yen 
or by 23% more than the previous year. This amount must be representing 
the substantial part of all the industrial investment made during the said 
year. 
In view of the fact that the production of mining and manufacturing 
industries was increased by 29 % and gross national products by 16 % over 
the previous year mainly based on such industrial investment, it could be 
claimed that to hold the growth rate at 9 % is still too conservative if the 
said growth rates were exceptionally large. In contrast with above, how 
about the figure of 7.2% as originally advocated by the Economic Planning 
Agency? They also have their own reasoning. The figure close to this 
percentage first appeared before the people on the Economic White Paper 
compiled for the year of 1957 which was characterized by the self-retrospection 
of the "too rapid economic expansion". By" too rapid economic ex-
pansion" was meant that the forecast of the growth rates of gross national 
products and of the production of mining and manufacturing industries then 
set respectively at 4.3 % and 7.3 % were actually praved to be 13.9 % for 
the former and 23.4% for the latter while private investment showed increase 
by 80 % over the previous year, and that they in turn brought about a 
drastic increase of import and the aggravation of international balance of 
payments. 
The said Economic White Paper then also stressed the importance of 
eliminating the so-called" dual economic structure". 
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The "dual economic structure" means that there is a wide dis:repancy 
·of income between the large enterprises and those of medium-small size in 
the presence of a great number of low-income people as well as of disguised 
employment under the pressure of over-population. Moreover the labour 
population is to continue to increase for the coming ten years. In order to 
secure jobs for them, the economic growth rate must be maintained on a 
pitch as high as possible. "The growth rate of 4% will hardly be able to 
absorb such yearly increasing population and to with stall further aggravation 
-of the dual structure. May be it is too much to expect a speed of 11 % 
such as of express train while said 4% is the velocity too slow of a local 
train; it is therefore eagerly hoped for to take at least the growth rate of 
-6-7%, a moderate pace of running a semi-express". (Economic White 
Paper, 1957 p. 38,) 
This was their conclusion and the figure of 7% was supposed to have 
been worked out particularly for the sake of the employment policy to 
overcome the economic dual structure. Now it could be summarized that 
the rate of 9 % is the figure advocated from the standpoint of industrial 
investment in favour of the large enterprises, while that of 7.2 % is the figure 
for the persuance of the policy aimed at narrowing the gap of the dual 
economic structure. However on the other hand, Shimomura theory too 
points out the p:Jssibility as well as the necessity of maintaining high rate 
Df investment even in face of the labour abundance in Japan, while the 
Economic White Paper of this year also presented a positive structural policy 
(constitutional improvement of agricultural management, fostering of high-
processing industry, encouragement of industrial combinate, the improvement 
Df the research and development capability as well as the decentralization 
Df industries etc.) in preparation for the economic liberalization. Therefore 
unless the above two contentions are put into contrast as to the sheer point 
Df 9% and 7.2% or from the narrow view point of the speed of economic 
growth, (the former is inherently contending for high speed economic growth 
while the latter advocating for the removal of dual economic structure), the 
two are considered to have lost each identity at least in the facial expre-
ssion of the new policy* of Ikeda Cabinet. 
The problem however lies in that neither Shimomura theory nor Eco-
nomic Planning Agency fail to recognize the reality that the rapid growth 
* " ... By properly leading and guiding the economic growth, it aims to have national economy 
achieve almost doubled income level within the coming ten years, materializing full em-
ployment having the incomes between that of fo!'estry and fishery and other industries, 
those between large enterprises and small enterprises, those among that of each region 
balanced each other so that economic security will be given also to those who a!"e econo-
mically less competent." 
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of economy itself has accelerated the aggravation of dual economic structure 
in the process of industrial investment boom and therefore none of them 
have worked out the· policy based on such sheer reality though the contention 
for rapid economic growth and that advocating for the removal of dual 
structure are compromized at least from the standpoint of economic policy. 
As already described, the White Paper of 1957 only pointed out the pressure 
of over-population as what has brought about the dual structure while warning 
the industrial investment to be excessive just from the international balance 
of payments. 
The dual structure has surely its deep root in the historical background 
of Japan who had been once left far behind the advanced countries and 
therefore such structure newly accelerated by the speedy growth of national 
economy in the post-war years starting from the said social foundation is 
something to be seriously studied. In the second and third sections, this. 
problem is further explored. 
Apart from what may be the reason for this, so long as the government 
persues the policy for such high degree of economic growth, they have to· 
face the task of having the economic gaps narrowed down and of carrying 
out the economic renovation, and this is a problem of grave importance. 
The reason why the Economic White Paper of this year presented the 
structural policy (the policy to correct the industrial structure) is supposed to· 
lie in this point. This involves, in a sence, the most serious problem faced 
by the government after the war, the significance of which are almost equaL 
to the democratization policy and land-reformation program enforced in the 
post-war days. 
In order to overcome such anticipated crisis and to resolve the problem 
of dual structure, new policy places greater emphasis on tax reduction, public 
investment and social security programs etc. Thus among these the problem 
particularly on the controversial aspects of the public investment will be 
further examined in the Section 4 and 5. 
Public investment is necessary, in the first place, for the direct reinfor-· 
cement of the facilities that sustain the productive power in rapid growth 
(for example, roads, harbour facilities, industrial water, etc.). 
Secondly it is required to correct the unbalance between the ever-
expanding production and consumption (Shimomura theory also recogmzes. 
this point). 
In the third place, it is demanded for the modernization of the agrarian 
areas that have so far been barely supported by the conventional policy for 
the maintenance of small owner-farmers. 
Last but certainly not least, it is needed for ironing out such frictions 
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and inconsistency that are to be accompanied by the high rate of growth of 
productive power, namely for the rearrangement among various industries, 
relocation of labour force, prevention of unemployment as well as for the 
improvement of public welfare facilities, etc., 
It must duly be noted here, however, that such public investment policy 
is to be carried out in a socio-economic climate quite different from that 
before the war when the economic policy could find its mainstay in Keynesian 
theory. Whereas the social realities then dealt by Keynesian theory was a 
type of panic desperately called for public investment that could answer to 
the serious shortage of effective demand and the unemployment resulted from 
the insufficiency of private investment, our current private investment is so 
active as to produce Shimomura theory. Maybe the problems of excessive 
equipment and economic depression might emerge therefrom, but it is for 
the purpose to adjust a number of frictions and inconsistency being caused by 
the increase of production power and therefore to further push ahead the 
private investment that the p·ublic investment is currently demanded. 
Thus the civilian sub-committee of the Economic Deliberation Council 
concluded as follows: private sector and the private investments are the 
driving force for the materialization of the Income Doubling Program while 
the government should recede into the position to play only a supplementary 
role and focus its efforts to the public investment to fortify the economic 
foundations that are to bolster the activities of the civilian industries. 
Therefore the large enterprises should realize that the great social res-
ponsibilties rest upon their shoulders (Nippon Keizai Shinbun, Sept. 30). 
Thus the government theoretically retreats into the background of indirect 
controlling and this must certainly be their idea underlying the Income 
Doubling Program, but nevertheless, the new policy counting upon the 
spontaneous increase of financial revenue has already provoked claims in 
the preliminary budget prepared by the various administrative branches of 
the government such as for the increase of the number of officials amount 
-ing to as many as 119,000 personnel and also for the setting-up of four 
public corporate bodies by the different ministries for the same purpose of 
the administration of water utilization apparently taking advantage of the 
current public investment policy. Such move of the government makes us 
suspicious of the enlargement of officialdom (Nippon Kei;:;ai Slzinbun, Sept. 
22, "Down with the increase of government officials "). 
Also there is a growing apprehension if the local self-government might 
be oppressed due to the tax reduction policy and as the result of the control 
of financial source for the emphatic enforcement of the new policy. (KyotO' 
Shinbun, Oct. 10, "Local organizations should be united "). 
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Again, many are afraid that should the civilians come to be unable to 
keep up with the positive policy of economic growth, the official control 
might come to be intensified (Asahi Sh!nbun, Sept. 6). Such apprehensive 
feeling as reflected in the public opinion has its reasoning. "The policy 
for high rate economic growth might be pursued at the sacrifice of democracy" 
sounds like a paradox but it involves a great danger. 
II. Inc01ne Doubling and IncoIne Discrepancy 
The Eonomic Planning Agency critisizes Shimomura theory, the sponsor 
of the growth rate of 9 %, with the following reasons (Nippon Keizai 
Shinbun): "according to Shimomura theory, the productive capacity is 
first estimated above all, on the basis of industrial investment trend and 
then the outline scale of national gross products is figured out therefrom. 
This national gross products are, in turn, allocated to such demand factors 
as government spending, inventory investment, housing investment, export, 
etc. and the remaining balance is ap?~opriated to the individual consumption. 
As the result, the spending of consumption is to result in the annual 
increase by over 10%. On the other hand, according to the calculation 
made by the Economic Planning Agency, while the growth rate of NGP 
during 1959 as against the previous year was 16 %, the rise in the individual 
consumption level was but 4.8%. It has been thus proved to be too much 
to expect the yearly expansion of consumption over 10% and if such rate 
is to be maintained, the monetary wage must be drastically raised." 
According to Shimomura theory, the gross production and gross consum-
ption are to be balanced each other, and should the consumption of the 
individual fail to measure up to that level, a proper demand-stimulating 
policy will have to be employed. 
If it is so, the critisizer and the critisized are supposed to be standing 
on the same theoretical footing, and yet there is a difference of nuance in 
that the Economic Planning Agency, though it minds the gap between the 
production and the consumption, is more cautious of the policy that may 
cause inflation. 
Now, if it is admitted, as already referred to, that Shimomura theory 
has an aspect as supported by the idea of the national economic accounting 
based on the equilibrium between the gross production and the gross con-
sumption, it is quite natural if said theory ignores the process of producing 
various unbalances including the income discrepancy in the course of the 
production increase and also the process of bringing about an un balance 
between the production and consumption. 
Candidly speaking, the national economic accounting is nothing but a 
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book-keeping of the national economy which is so made as to always keep 
balance between the incoming production and the outgoing consumption 
regardless of the ups and downs of the national economy. Therefore it 
provides no clue to solve the problem of the actual unbalance. 
Elaborating upon it a little further, the terminology of national gr03S 
products as used for the purpose of the national economic accounting is, in 
reality, such and such tons of steel products, for instance, of Yahata Steel 
Works. 
As already touched upon in the previous chapter, behind the large 
makers who gain profits several times more than what they originally expected 
there must be a great number of medium-small enterprises who have to 
retrench their business scale being driven into a predicament by an intense 
competition. 
Besides above, we have to think of the process of how such gigantic 
sum of profits, in the form of dividends and interests, stream back to the 
hands of those having large capital and to the large income earners through 
the mechanism of taxation and monetary policies, an integral part to the 
policy of Income Doubling Program. The table (I) is presented here to 
show such trend through the increase of stocks classified by the owner and 
its distribution. According to this table the increase of the stocks possessed 
by industrial companies is most salient mostly due to the fact that the 
mutual holding of stocks among the companies for the formation of com-
binate has become popular since 1958, and yet the number of stocks held 
by the financial institutes is overwhelmingly large. 





N umber of stocks issued 19,467,480 17.3 % 
(unit: 1000 stocks) 
Number of stockholders 6,937 6.3 % 
No. of stocks held per industrial co. 
No. of stocks held per financial institute 
No. of stocks held per capita 




Distribution according to the No. of stocks held 
No. of 
stockholders 
Over 100 thousand stocks - 0/0 
Below 5 thousand stocks 96.140/0 
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Such mutual ties between industrial companies and financial institutes 
<lre giving rise to a complicated issue as to whether or not the dividend be 
entered in the profit account as a part of tax reduction program and this 
point is yet remaining to be clarified by the new policy. 
Such obsecurity, however, implicitely indicates, that one of the focal 
points of the tax reduction policy in question is to facilitate capital-accumula-
tion. While the number of investors in general has increased, the relative 
importance of such individual stockholders has decreased against that of 
corporate persons. 
Though the number of medium-small shareholders having less than 
5,000 stocks are strikingly large, the number of shares held by them occupies 
but 33.21 %. 
When such actual process of production and distribution is closely observed 
we can safely say that there exists a wide dis:repancy among the economic 
groups of large, medium and small scale in the share of national income 
corresponding to the national gross products within the frame-work of national 
·economic accounting. 
Now, however, the low-income earners who are the majority among 
them are sensitively afflicted, in the process of economic circulation, by even 
a slight rise of commodity price, tax and other fees which is to be entailed 
by Income Doubling Program as will be referred to later, and thus their 
actual spending will have to be curtailed. 
If it is so, the unbalance between the gross production and the gross 
spending will sooner or later take place. The causes that invite a new dual 
structure are existent in all phases of the production, distribution and con-
sumption of the economic circulation in the course of high growth rate of 
national economy. 
I cannot afford to make further analysis of the over-all processes of the 
·economic circulation here, instead my study is now focused on the income 
discrepancy to take place in the process of distribution and consumption. 
A material that indicates the income discrepancy classified according to 
the income brackets, is quoted from the Economic White .Raper. The Table 
(2) shows the result of the survey on domestic economy of the workers 
living in the urban areas throughout Japan conducted by the Statistics 
Bureau of Prime Minister's Office which is presented in terms of the household 
of 5 persons. (Economic White Paper 1960, p. 264). In this table, five 
brackets from (l) to (5) gained respectively an income increase ranging from 
7.3% to 8.2% over the previous year which is close to the growth rate of 
7.2 % originally worked out by the Economic planning Agency. However 
as to the brackets of (1) and (2), the growth of consumption spending is 
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held substantially lower than that of income, and moreover as for the bracket 
(1) the red-ink of ¥ 2,910 is recorded. 
Even apart from the domestic economy of (1) and setting up the bracket 
-of (2) as a standard, the income of (5) is 2.5 times as much as that of (2) 
and the surplus of domestic economy of the former is 9 times as much as 
that of the latter. 
The problem of low-income earners has been a serious issue since the 
<lo-called " Jinmu boom" (1955-1956) when the number of those belonging 
to the low-income bracket whose annual income were less than ¥ 80,000 
had increased from 2,640,000 to 3,260,000, while the number of employees 
having the monthly income of less than ¥ 8,000 was said to have expanded 
from 5,270,000 to 6,160,000. (Low income earners totaled ca. 10,000,000). 
Since then, though the nominal income of these low-wage workers has 
increased, the income discrepancy has persistently continued to exist as seen 
in the Table (2). This particular issue has been consecutively taken up for 
public attention in the annual white paper compiled by the Welfare Min-
istry, and therefore I am not going any further into its details, but it is 
.afraid that such manneristic presentation of the problem might lead the 
people into thinking of a plausible excuse of "over-population pressure" 
instead of seriously tackling this problem. 
The income difference cannot simply be explained by "over-population 
pressure". By far authentic is to examine the process that entailed such 
income discrepancy analysing the dynamic growth of economy as had been 
seen during the period from "Jinmu boom" to "Iwato boom" than to 
.look into this problem from static viewpoint. 
Table (2) Balance of payments of domestIC economy of the 
worker's household classified by income bracket 
2 3 4 5 
Disposable Income 15,700 25,797 32,815 40.382 63,048 
Expenditure 18,612 24,097 29,220 34,752 47,597 
Balance -2,910 + 1,701 +3,595 +6,080 + 15,451 
Growth rate Disponsable 8.20/0 7.3 0/0 8,20/0 7,50/0 8,20/0 
against Income 
previous 
year Expenditure 4,9 5,6 7,3 7,2 6,0 
The Table 2 indicates that the income curve from (I) toward (5) traces 
sharper rising trend than the expenditure curve (the income of (5) is 4.0 
times as much as that of (1) while the expenditure of (5) is only 2.5 times 
,as much as that of (1)). 
Because the expenditure tends to be comparatively slow-responsive to 
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the change of income, the lower-income groups either record deficit or leave 
slimmer surplus in their domestic economy, while higher income blackets 
show reverse. Then, what are the items of household expenditure that 
make it comparatively constant regardless of the income? To answer this, 
let us see the ratio of spending for foodstuffs which are taking lead in the 
current price rise, as against the total expenditure. This ratio or Engel's 
coefficient is currently 38.2 % (Tokyo Metropolis) in the case of the standard 
worker's household (expenditure: ¥ 37,422). When such consumption spen-
ding approaches Y 15,000 said coefficient even goes beyond 50 %. In such 
case, for instance, 6 % of price rise in foods means already a heavy burden 
on the part of the low-income earning class. 
The rise of price that follows the current rise of commodity price is 
seen in utility service having so-called monopoly or administrative price 
such as city water, power, gas, transportation and communication, medical 
treatment, education and other public fees and taxation. The proportion 
of such expenditure in a standard domestic economy of the workers occupies 
31.9%, and it is worse in case of those belonging to lower-income bracket 
where the burden of taxation has become the heaviest among them all since 
after the war apart from the current price rise, whereas it was only 26.3 % 
for the standard household economy in the prewar days. 
Since the standard Engel's coefficient before the war (see Welfare White 
Paper of 1951) was 35.6% (household of city workers), the current one is 
still a bit higher. Therefore the domestic economy in the post-war days is 
supposed to become less flexible due to the increased weight of the expen-
diture for food-stuffs as well as that of the imposed spending for public fees, 
tax etc.. The price increase of these items first attack low-income earners 
and it accelerates the widening of income gaps. 
The problem lies therefore in that the very factor entailing the rise of 
commodity prices and fees inherently exists in the high rate economic growth 
itself. 
Viewing first from consumption, it should not be overlooked that a 
popular word of so-called "consumption boom" provokes the desire-of those 
belonging to the medium or lower income bracket to gain more cash income 
per worker and or per household in their efforts to keep up with the 
economic boom and to elevate themselves beyond their meager subsistence, 
and this in turn augments their cash-spending and it will further bring about 
a distorted" demonstration effect". 
The expenditure of the low-income earners is first directed to the food-
stuffs and services of the petty enterprises, but because of the low productivity 
and the poor mechanism of distribution, these enterprises cannot meet the 
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increase of said demand. Here, one of the forces to raise the price of com-
modities and fees starts to move. 
On the other hand the same desire of the low-income earners to gain 
more cash in the days of economic boom constitutes the factor to raise the 
cost of wage in the cottage industries. 
Though the current industrial investment of high rate is providing more 
chances of employment, it does not necessarily facilitate the flow of the 
working forces direct to the large enterprises due to the existence of a thick 
strata of petty enterprises in this country. 
I t should rather say that the migration of the laborers from the agrarian 
villages to the cottage industries and the movement of workers from one cot-
tage industry to the other outnumber those absorbed by the large industries, 
and this is bringing about a substantial increase of initial wages in the petty 
industries. It is not limited to the wage increase alone. The small enter-· 
prises facing the keener competition of securing the labor, now find it ne-
cessary to improve welfare facilities for the workers if they want to keep 
them to the jobs. Again they have to modernise their stores and equipments 
in order to survive the cut-throat competition among them. They are also 
demanded to spend more money to conform to the Public Sanitation Law 
and are obligated to subsidize the employees for the practice of social insu-
rance plan. 
In the case of the small enterprises whose survival has so far greatly 
been depending on the low wage of low productivity, the cost-raising factors 
as mentioned above cannot but be reflected directly on the price rise of 
their selling products. 
However such price rise wiII in turn bring pressure particularly upon 
the subsistence of low-income people. Thus the current increase of cash 
income of those belonging to the low-income brackets and the price of the 
consumer goods mostly seen as to the products of small enterprises are in-
fluencing upon each other and they are, all in all, paving the way to a 
new double structure in the process of high economic growth. 
The factors causing higher public fees and taxes should be explained 
from different angle and since they have greatly to do with the policies of 
the central and local governments as well as with public investment, and 
since they are to be dealt with as a major subject in Chapter 4 and on,. 
here only the followings are pointed out: 
Here in this country the high investment is being made despite the 
insufficient capital accumulation, a conflict between the private and public 
investments and again between one public investment and the other inevi-
tably takes place. Because of this, the shortage or lagging of the investment 
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in the public construction programs or in the projects of public corporation 
are witnessed, and it, in turn, entails the heavier burden of monetary inte-
rests as well as that of the redemption of the principal sum. 
Thus in order to tide over such predicament they come to seek its solu-
tion by raising the public fees. There must be another reasons for raising 
the fees but the primary reason can be found therein. 
In the last place, what financially oppresses the low-income people and 
has greatly to do with the public policy as well as public investment, is the 
problem of rising price of land and the house rent. 
Judging from the relative price, taking the year of 1952 as the base, 
the rise of residential cost ranks atop and moreover the descrepancy, in the 
housing conditions of the rented rooms-the houses financed by local govern-
ments and by public housing corporation-rented houses, is the direct reflec-
tion of that of income, namely the cost of residence is heavier for those 
belonging to the lower income bracket. (It is the heaviest for the people 
whose subsistence is subsidized by the government as well as those living in 
slam quaters). 
One exception is the case of the household economy of the standard 
worker's family where the house and land rents are indicated to be relatively 
low. This may be attributable to the economic control enforced during and 
after the war. 
However when viewed from another angle, it can be considered as an 
indication that the domestic economy of the workers has become more rigid 
as compared with that of the pre-war days and that this is oppressing the 
housing expenditure, thus they have to be satisfied with poorer housing 
conditions. 
The nominal wage of 1960 is 307 times as high as that of the prewar 
days (base: 1934-1936), while the consumer price of the foodstuffs is 338 
times and tax is 844 times (national and local taxes per capita), whereas 
the housing expenditure is held only 219 times. 
However as mentioned already the rise of housing cost of late is stupen-
dous, namely the house building cost is 610 time as high as that of the 
prewar standard while the price of land is 810 times. The rent of houses 
constructed by the local government or by the Public Housing Corporation 
is not determined by the demand-supply but by the cost-accounting. There-
fore the rise of house building cost and that of price of land will be imme-
diately reflected on the house-rent and it oppresses the low-income people, 
while such explosive rise of the price of land obviously has its root in the 
policy for the high rate growth of economy. 
Summarizing what has been mentioned above, we can say that there 
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exists a vicious cycle between the Income Doubling Program and the mcome 
discrepancy. 
Though high growth of economy as being carried out on the basis of 
high private investment paves the way for a rapid augmentation of employ-
ment, it does not serve to the removal of the dual structure existing in the 
Japanese industries. Instead it will further accelerate the price rise and acts 
cas a cause to additionally create dual structure through the process of such 
·economic expansion. 
Moreover in such high growth, the price of land and stocks as well as 
interest etc. belonging to the category of "unproductive income" will be 
further raised while public fees will get higher. This too helps deepen the 
.dual structure and create further income discrepancy. 
This means that the policy of the public authorities should now bear 
greater responsibility for the liquidation of the dual structure because it is 
through tax re-adjustment (Reformation of tax system) as well as by means 
·of the public investment that such inherent problem find its solution. 
III. Regional Discrepancy and Regional Concentration 
of Economic Power 
The income discrepancy is an abstract expression of dual structure using 
the terms of economics. I n the course of the study on this particular sub-
ject, it cannot but come face to face with the problem of the concentration 
and monopoly of the economic power to be caused by the economic circula-
tion in high economic growth. 
In this chapter, the problems of regional discrepancy and the regional 
concentration of economic power to be brought about in the economic cir-
.culation among different regions are to be analysed. 
The Japanese economy even before the War had been characterized by 
the high rate of growth since Meiji era and this had resulted in the main-
tenance of the vast areas of agrarian villages controlled under a semi-feudalistic 
landlord system. This was, in fact, a geographical double structure. Then, 
how has the high economic growth after the war with said landlord system 
.done away with, changed said double structure? This can be presented 
perhaps as the problem under monopoly in its strict sense of the word. * 
* Since the authentic statistics as to the distribution of national income according to the 
geographical locations are lacking, it is hardly possible to make comparative study on the 
change in the regional discrepancy of economic power between pre. and post-war. 
However if the difference of the tax amount borne by per resident could be taken as an 
indirect indication of the regional discrepancy of economic power, the changes taken place 
from pre-war to post-war could be mferred. 
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As already seen above, though the intention of the government to liqui-. 
date the dual structure by the policy of high-rate economic growth could be 
observed, they lacked the due recognition that the high grow-th of economy 
itself had proved to intensify the dual structure. Sooner or later the gap 
between their intention and the economic reality will be made clarified. 
In fact when the growth rate of 7.2 %, the basis of their new policy 
was raised to 9 %, the critical atmosphere in the Enlarged Council of Policy 
Deliberation of Liberal Democratic Party was said to have been quite do-
minating worrying that it might further intensify the discrepancy of econo-· 
mic power among the regions and that between the cities and the agrarian 
villages. Let us also pay attention to the fact that the apprehension that 
the high economic growth led by the industrial investment of large enter-
The change taken place from pre-war to post-war as 
to 5 developed and 5 under-developed prefectures 












































However in the above table, the pre-war difference that the highest (Tokyo) is 3.7 
times as high as the 10west (Iwate) and the post-war difference that the highest (Tokyo) 
is 9 times as much as the lowest (Kagoshima) are what were caused by the change took 
place in the structure of taxation and they are not necessarily representing ,the change of 
regional income difference itself. We, just the same, can roughly pick up 5 developed and 
5 under-developed prefectures from the standpoint of the discrepancy in the taxes borne by' 
each prefecture in the pre-war years and so with after the War as presented in the table 
where as for the developed area of 5 prefectures, viz. Hyogo and Kyoto showed such 
declining from 1934 to 1956 that the former ranked one step ,lower while the latter totally dIS-
appeared, and instead Kanagawa prefecture emerged. This means that Tokyo-Yokohama 
area has gained more importance over the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area in Its economic power. 
Talking about 5 under-developed prefectures such as Fukushima and Iwate belonging to 
Tohoku area (1934) disappeared in 1956- and instead, the fact that Kochi and Tokushima 
prefectures in Shikoku Island and Kagoshima prefecture located in the southern tip of 
Kyushu Island appeared as belonging to the under-developed area, may be worthy of our 
attention. 
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prises might produce dual structure, is gaining ground even within the Li-
beral-Democratic Party. 
Parties cannot help being sensItive to the intensification of the regional 
discrepancy of economic power because of their dependance upon the 
political support of the regional people whom they are representing. This 
holds true with the local governments as they are too regionally orga-
nized. 
This is the reason why the problem of regional discrepancy, regardless 
of its causes, has recently become a political highlight in connection with 
the Income Doubling Program. 
Of late the Economic Planning Agency and the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) have come to pay greater attention to 
the problem of rigional discrepancy of the economic power and that among 
enterprises. In particular, the former published a paper of "Analysis of the 
people's living conditions classified by regions" (I 959-Aug.). However the 
Economic Stabilization Board, the predecessor of the Economic Planning 
Agency made public already in 1950 "Analysis of current conditions accor-
ding to the prefecture" and "Problems in the measurement of local econo-
mic power" and had long tackled this problem. I have no knowledge as 
to how the regional analysis has been conducted in the transitions of admi-
nistrative mechanism since then. 
My impression is that the current studies on the analysis of regional 
problem is failing to make close study on the economic circulation among 
the regions and on the regional concentration of economic power, just en-
,ding up with the analysis of the regional differences as they are. I once 
prepared statistics as presented in Table 3 based on the regional analysis 
made by the Economic Stabilisation Board. 
(Y. Shima, Contempoary Local Finance, 1951) 
This was not simply intended to present the regional difference in the 
economic power but it tried to put in contrast the under-developed area 
gradually losing its weight, with the developed area to which the economic 
power is being concentrated in the order of production followed by income 
and then deposit. 
However the regional structure of the national economy as reflected on 
the table (3) is that on the stage of the post-war reconstruction where the 
income tax was absorbed from every corner of the agrarian villages through 
the taxation system imposed upon the masses and which was channeled into 
the large industries by the financial authorities that played dominating role 
m the income redistribution. 
Then, since 1950 the process of income distribution and redistribution 
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Table (3) The regional distribution of amounts 
of production, income and deposit. 
(1948) 
Production Income Deposit 
All Japan 1,000 1,000 1,000 
--~----- ---
Tokyo 71 136 251 
Osaka 78 82 124 
Aichi 47 54 65 
Kyoto 19 28 29 
------- -~"-- ... _---------" .. -----------
Iwate 13 8 7 
Yamanashi 6 6 4 
Shimane 5 5 3 
Kagoshima 13 12 5 
Miyazaki 10 8 4 
Contemporary Local Finance. 
centering around the monopoly has started to resume its function where-
income tax has come to be reduced, while public investment has come to-
rely on the accumulated funds. With such background, how has changed 
the regional economic structure? This must be the major subject of this paper 
but to my great regret there are no official data available to clarify this 
aspect of change. 
"Analysis of the people's living conditions classified by regions" too· 
seems to be indifferent to this ,problem, Though the White Paper on the 
locome qf the Peoples carries statistics on the income of the prefectural 
inhabitants, since that of the productive income of the prefectural people 
are missing as to some important prefectures, it is impossible to prepare a 
table corresponding to the Table (3). 
And yet an approximate trend of the regional concentration and differ-
ence in the economic power in the post-war years could be found out by 
tracing the changes took place in each prefecture as to the personnel income, 
corporate income, the incomes accrued from dividend and interest, etc. as· 
presented in the taxation statistics. 
These aspects have been made clear in my book Theory on the Con-
temporary State and Public Finance and therefore they are not referred to 
here. 
Besides, since The collected data for the measurement of the power qf the 
people classified by the local government jurisdiction (To-Do-Fu-Ken) compiled 
by Japan Red Cross Society :carries various regional statistics, though 
they are not by all means perfect, it could be possible to prepare a table· 
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somewhat similar to the Table (3). 
Table (4) The index of regional economic power 
I Amount of ship- Amount of bank I Capital of com-
ment of indus-
I trial products loan (year base) I panies 
---~--
All Japan 1,000 1,000 I 1,000 
Tokyo 148.2 438.5 438.4 
Kanagawa 72.2 13.4 28.5 
Osaka 131.1 179.6 175.3 
Hyogo 79.2 14.4 80.3 
Aichi 92.2 74.1 48.8 
Iwate 6.7 1.2 2.2 
Yamanashl 3.5 1.7 2.4 
Shimane 3.8 1.6 1.7 
Nagasaki 4.9 2.1 1.9 
Kagoshima 4.0 2.4 3.2 
Remarks: amount of shipment of industrial products, surveyed by MIT! 
in 1956; amount of bank loan is the survey of Bank of Japan (1958); 
capital of companies is the survey of National Taxation Bureau (1957). 
In the table above, the column of the capital of companies is given 
just for reference's sake, the index of which are quite corresponding respec-
tively to those of the amount of bank loan for the cases of Tokyo, Osaka 
as well as the under-developed prefectures, except those of Kanagawa and 
Hyogo prefectures where the weight of bank loan is far below that of the 
amount of industrial products shipment, but these two prefectures should be 
considered being covered by each economic zone of Tokyo and Osaka. 
Therefore, Japan can be roughly divided into two areas or into the 
area where the concentration of bank loan is getting intensified more than 
that of the amount of shipment of industrial products and the area where 
the trend is reverse (most of the prefectures belong to the latter). If the 
amount of shipment of industrial products is represented by the term of 
industrial power and that of bank loan is expressed by financial power, 
these two indicate, by and large, the law of economic circulation functioning 
among the regions. 
However in our country, where the economy is growing at high rate, 
the regional concentration of industry (industrial plants) is being taken up 
as a problem more serious than that of the financial power. The core of 
this problem is centered around the dual structure between the cities and 
the agricultural villages being brought about by the so-called concentration 
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of factories into 4 big industrial zones already began since before the war. 
According to the survey recently conducted by MITI, simultaneously 
with the widening of gap between the industrial powers of different scales, 
the regional concentration of such power is being greatly expedited, and 
the said 4 big industrial zones occupy 63 % of the industrial enterprises of 
all over Japan, 64.6 % of all workers, 68.~ % of total national output and 
70.4 % of all the added value. 
Particularly as for the added value, if that of the lowest prefecture of 
Kagoshima is taken as I, that of Tokyo is 169, Osaka 133, Kanagawa 92, 
Hyogo 86, and Aichi is 81. (Nippon Keizai Sh inbun, Sept. 13). This causes 
great difference in financial power between the so-called rich and poor 
prefectures. 
To cope with such situation, the government is now working out a pro-
gram of decentralization of industries, and on the other hand, local govrn-
ments are enthusiastically inducing the factories to their own territories. 
Originally, however, the very concentration of industries itself entices 
more intensive services of markets, traffics and communications, financial 
institutes and of other public facilities, and this again tends to push concentra-
tion spiral. 
Therefore in order to realize the industrial decentralization, it is a 
prerequisite to make a bold and ambitious public investment, but here again 
advantage goes to the rich prefectures that have easier access to the central 
government who sponsors public investment. 
On the other hand, the regional concentration of industries gives rise to 
the social problems such as of housing shortage, congestion of traffic, shortage 
of industrial and drinking water, of ground sinking, pollution of the air and 
river, and fire, etc. In order to mitigate such dilemma, public investment in 
the localities in question would have to be intensified. 
Therefore, when the potential budgetary spending accruing therefrom 
and burdens to be borne by the inhabitants are taken into consideration, 
the difference of rich and poor among the local public bodies is nothing but 
a mere show and is deceptive. Should the budgetary balance of a well-to-
do regional public body record surplus, the inhabitants there, particularly the 
people of low-income bracket will have deficit in their domestic economy. 
The one who benefits most is the central government who can most effici-
ently take out national taxes from a selected few well-to-do regions amoun-
ting to several tens of billions of yen in the form of the natural increase of 
revenue. 
Again, the problem of the regional concentration of the financial power 
stands on the way of the decentralization of industries. The concentration 
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-of financial and monetary power to Tokyo has its origin in the days of war 
economy, and as it was so much fostered during the occupation that the most 
of the head offices of chemical fibre manufacturing companies have been 
moved to Tokyo from Kansai in the climate of industrial investment boom 
started since 1956. 
In the full swing of investments a single new project alone sometimes 
amounts to even one billion yen, and it necessitates to hold negotiations for 
raising funds in Tokyo. It is then, obvious that the formation of a combi-
nate among enterprises all the more brings leading bankers and industrial 
magnates together and helps expedite regional combination. 
The regional concentration (regional discrepancy) of financial powers 
reflect itself first on that of stock ownership and the exchange of stocks to 
the large cities (particularly Tokyo). 
45.98 % of stocks are owned by the residents in Tokyo, 15.58 % in O-
saka while the ratio of the total stocks possessed by those in the prefectures 
covering 6 largest cities as against the national total is 76.96 %. (Surveyed 
by Nissho-Japan Security Co.: latter half of 1959). Moreover, the annual 
amount of transaction in Tokyo Stock Exchange expanded 40 times from 
1960 to 1959 while its ratio against the national total rose from 56.1 % to 
66.6 %. On the other hand, though the amount of transaction in Osaka 
and Nagoya stock exchanges increased about 30 times, its ratio against the 
national total declined from 28.1 % to 24.9 % in the case of the former, 
while the latter from 5.8% to 4%. This was the result of industrial investment 
boom during the said period. 
The regional concentration of financial power can be also recognized 
by observing the transition, after a certain interval of time, of regional 
concentration percentage of the outstanding deposit in and the loans of all 
the banks classified by the prefecture. Table (5) is the comparison made 
between 1951 and 1960, which indicates the transition in 10 years including 
the period of investment boom after the war. 
During this time-span the total national deposit expanded from 1,000 
billion yen to 7,700 billion yen, while the amount of total national loans 
from 990 billion yen to 7,200 billion yen. 
In either case, the concentration percentages of the eight regions as 
selected in the table (5) are large. However, when the amount of bank 
deposit is viewed, the weight of all the regions had gone down during this 
period except Tokyo, and the concentration ratio of the 8 regions declined 
from 72.0 % of the national total to 68.7 %, while as to the amount of bank 
loan, the percentages of Tokyo, Aichi and Osaka went up and thu~ the 
-concentration ratio of 8 regions rose from 72.2 % to 76.8 %. 
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Table (5) 
Transition of Concentration (0/0) of the Outstanding 
Deposit and Loan of Banks all over Japan. 
Concentration (%) of Concentration (0/0) of 







All Japan I 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Tokyo 27.6 32.5 33.4 39.6 
Kanagawa 9.2 3.0 1.8 !.7 
Shizuoka 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.9 
Aichi 6.8 6.7 6.2 6.8 
Kyoto 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.8 
Osaka 15.3 14.9 18.7 19.2 
Hyogo 4.6 3.8 4.6 3.1 
Fukuoka 3.5 2.9 3.3 2.7 
(Bank of Japan: Monthly report on financial statistics and 
Monthr) report on economic statistics,) 
Remarks: 1951: End of Jan .. 1960: End of June. 
In both years of 1951 and 1960, the percentages of the amount of the· 
deposit in and the loan of the banks are high for Tokyo and Osaka as be-
ing only two regions that saw the ratio of concentration of loan higher than 
that of deposit. However in 1960 the concentration ratio of loan in Aichi 
prefecture went slightly over that of the deposit. This indicates the large 
growth rate of investment in this region. These transitions tell us that ex-
cept Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, in all the remaining 5 regions, to say no-
thing of those not listed on the table (5), the loan ratio is lower than de-
posit ratio through the said period. The pattern that the private funds of 
local regions are pumped up and absorbed into the three major cities has 
continued to exist for the past 10 years. Such trend will be made all the 
more clear when the observation is made as to the operations of Bureau of 
Funds, Annuity Funds of Easy-Payment Insurance of financial machineries 
of Agricultural Association as well as that of the National Annuity Funds to 
be newly established, all of which have closely linked to the public investment. 
In order to make closer access to the problem of public investment, 
let us examine the flow among regions of the financial funds (national re-
venue). The flow of the financial funds inherently involves authoritarian 
factors such as taxation and the sales of the products of Monopoly bureau 
and in fact, it helps mitigate a regional dual structure. Such function 
is currently called," built-in stabilizer." 
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As we can see thereby, the move of financial funds is, when viewed 
from over-all stand-point, accelerating the regional concentration of economic 
power together with the private finance or even more powerfully than the 
latter. This particular picture can be well proved by the table of the go-
vernment payments to or receipts from open market classified by the juris-
diction of each branch of the Japan Bank. 
The table (6) is the one prepared in 1956 and is a bit out of date, . 
but it still serves to indicate the general trend. 
Table (6) Distribution % of the government payments to or 
receipts from open market as classified by the 






Public Taxation Income Payment Project 
All Japan 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Kanto 46.9 44.6 64.5 20.7 
Hokkaido 4.7 2.8 4.4 12.3 
Tohoku 4.5 3.5 4.3 8.5 
Shinetsu 4.2 3.8 3.0 7.0 
Tokai 7.9 9.0 3.9 9.9 
Kinki 18.6 24.5 9.0 14.6 
Chugoku 4.3 3.9 3.6 9.4 
Shikpku 1.7 I 1.6 1.5 3.9 Kyushu 7.1 6.3 5.8 I 12.5 
(Prepared from the report on Balance of Payments of national treasury, 
Treasury Bureau. Bank of Japan-1956.) 
The gross income of this table includes those of the accounts of Food-
stuffs Control, National Railways, Telegraph and Telephone Public Corpora-
tion, Bureau of Funds, and of Foreign Exchange. This gross income is out-
standingly concentrative and when Kanto and Kinki are put together, it 
occupies 65 % of the total. 
The regional structure of the taxation revenue is roughly corresponding 
to that indicated in this table. Namely, the financial revenue comes heavily 
from the wealthy regions of the country, and this trend of concentration is 
more pronounced with the gross payment. 
The typical examples are the payment of the outlay of national defence 
of the government general accounts and that of Foreign Exchange Account .. 
The sum to be paid from Foodstuff Control Account is first deposited in the 
Central Depository of Agriculture and Forestry from the national treasury 
before it is remitted to its regional branches. Therefore though it is to be 
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eventually decentralized, the huge sum is at least temporarily stay in the 
capital city and this is something to seriously think about. There are of-
course such items which are comparatively decentralized as the expenditure 
for the local public projects as you see in the table. 
The item similar to this one is the government subsidy for the compul-
sory education, subsidy to the local government revenue, etc. When the 
relations between the concentrative taxation revenue from the wealthy re-
gions as seen above and such dispersing payment to the local areas alone 
are taken up it gives us an impression that the national finance is trying 
to correct the dual structure or the gap between the wealthy and poor re-
gions. The system of the central government subsidy to the local govern-
ment revenue is, as mentioned above, a typical one and as the matter 
of fact, by such system, huge amount of corporate and income taxes 
collected from the wealthy regions is being re-dist 'ributed to the local 
public bodies according to their economic power. 
However, it must be noted, that the objective of such system is to help 
the local administrations standardize themselves according to a certain cri-
terion and that such re-distribution is in itself an evidence that the centralisa-
tion of financial and monetary powers is so remarkably advanced. 
The system of government subsidy to the local public bodies and the 
public projects should therefore be regarded from the aspect of concentra-
tion of economic power and authorities rather than to see it as being a 
means to correct the local difference. 
IV. Elevation of Industrial Structure and the Public Investlnent 
Public investment is given an important role to play in the "Income 
Doubling Program". In the national economy 10 years after the basic year, 
the weight of the secondary industries (mining, manufacturing, and construc-
tion) is expected to see the highest increase (from 33% to 39%), but from 
the standpoint of capital formation, a great emphasis is placed on the 
"administrative investment" for the strengthening of industrial foundations 
(it may tentatively be regarded here as a financial investment in social and 
indirect capital), while the civilian investment in industry will be slightly 
slowed down (from 51, 9% to 43,7%). 
Such anticipation is supported by the idea that there was already a 
sharp rise of capital coefficient in the basic year (average of 1956-1958) and 
thus the pressure of the productive capacity thus expanded is to be mitiga-
ted by the administrative investment, a substantial demand factor in the 
future. For such purpose a certain control over the investment must of-
<;ource be exercised on both the civilian investment and public investment 
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as referred to later, but in order to make closer access to the problem of 
the weight of public investment, comparison is made here as to the pattern 
of the industrial structure of Western-Europe (West Germany), a goal of the 
Income Doubling Program and the ultimate picture of Japanese industrial 
structure 10 years ahead. 
According to the table (7) the ratio of the individual consumption is 
to be equal to that of West Germany in 1957, while the gross capital forma-
tion including the said administrative investment will surpass that of West 
Germany. 
Table (7) CornpaIison as to the structure of national income 
by industries and the gross spending classified 
Comparison of the structure of national inco!lle 
classified by industries (0/0) 
------------------
Japan w. Germany 
Basic Target 1957 year year 
Primary Ind. 19 10 9 
Secondary Ind_ 33 39 49 
Tertiary Ind_ 38 40 49 
Traffic Camm .. 10 11 8 Public utilities 
National Income 100 100 100 
Comparison of the structure of gross national 
spending (0/0) 
Gross Consumption 70 67 72 
Individual Cons. 60 58 58 
Government Cons. 10 9 14 
Gross investment 30 32 24 
Gross capital formation 26 29 22 
Inventory 4 3 2 
Ordinary Overseas Surplus 4 
Gross national spending 100 100 100 
As to the structure of national income classified by industries, the weight of 
the primary industry of Japan approaches that of West Germany but the 
ratio of the secondary industry is still substantially below that of the latter. 
In the domains of the service industry, traffic and communication as well 
as the public utilities, the weight goes beyond these of West Germany. 
That the weight of these two branches of industry is high means that the 
ratio of the public investment other than the "administrative investment" 
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referred to In connection with the gross spending, is ~high, while the large 
expansion rate as to the secondary industries also implies the same. 
The scale of these public investments may perhaps be indicating the 
low level of fthe capital concentration and accumlation of productive power 
and thus be showing the relative weakness of the monopolistic status in Japan 
,even after 10 years, to say nothing of today, in comparison with those of 
West Germany at present. 
Let us now give thought to the present realities rather than to those 
ten years ahead, and in order to further took into the problem, statistics are 
quoted from the Economic White Paper for the year of 1960. 
Table (8) is a comparison as to the equipment investment as well as 
the capital unit per large enterprise between Japan and West Germany. 
Table (8) Comparison as to the equipment investment unit and capital 
unit between the enterprise in Japan and West Germay 
Average unit of 
investment per 
company (A) 
Average unit of 
capital per I (A)/(B) Type of 
industry company (B) I I~-----,--- ----~-- -,-----
____________ , Jap~I __ w, G:_ Japan_-,--_W_,_G_~LJap_a_n_+-_w_. _G_,_ 
Mining 
Construction 


















































































Remarks: 736 Japanese companies having capital of over ¥ 100.000,000 were 
chosen, while 873 large enterprises in W. G. were taken up. 
(Prepared from the statistics appeared on page 331-332 of Economic 
Whit, Paper-1960) 
It is obvious from this table that with the exception of the industries 
,of consumer goods as well as shipbuilding and construction that have been 
expanded by the government investment and financing, all other heavy and 
chemical industries are markedly lower than those in West Germany parti-
,cularly as to the capital unit, and yet since the over-strained investment in 
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·equipment is made, the ratio of the investment unit as against the capital 
unit goes up even more than 70-80%. Besides in Japan the company's 
capital is not always fully paid-up, said percentage actually goes even be-
yond 100 % in many cases. 
Still other observation can be made in the table (8); we can not only 
find out therefrom the low level of capital concentration and of the accu-
mulation of productive power, relative weakness of monopolistic status as 
already referred to above but also such characteristics of Japanese economy 
'as excessive competition among the monopolistic groups, overlapping investment, 
the rise of capital coefficinet or the overhead-cost of individual enterprise, 
excessive dependence upon the borrowed capital and loan, pressure of capi-
tal cost (finance cost), and the increase of public investment to mitigate and 
reduce the burden of such capital cost, the haphazardness and the ineffici-
. ency of public investment that swings to and fro according to the competi-
tion among the monopoly groups, the rise of capital coefficient and capital 
cost within the public corporation and public utility enterprise, as well as 
raising of public fees to cover up said burdens, etc .. 
This means, in other words, that the weight of public investment and 
its allocation to the different ends in a given country may probably be de-
termined by the degree of capital concentration and of the accumulation of 
productive power and by the scale of industrial investment, by the size of 
capital co-efficient, speed of economic growth as well as by the change ta-
king place in the industrial structure and last but not least by the co-rela-
tions among industries. Of course I am not attempting here to work out 
the law of public investment, instead what mentioned above is just a hypo-
thesis, thus I am only attempting to further approach the problem of public 
investment in the course of high growth on such hypothesis. "The elucida-
tion of Income Doubling Program" carries a table in which the demarcation 
between the fields of each civilian and public investments is drawn. 
Modifying this table a little, the field proper for the public investment 
is further examined. 
The said table is by no means a perfect one and the borderline among 
. each field is quite obscure, but anyway I will make a general explanation 
·of same as follows: 
(A) represents the limitation of public investment on one end in a sense 
that it could be replaced with civilian investment depending upon the extent 
of the capital accumulation of the latter. While (D) shows the limitation of 
public investment on other end. This is the field where administrative in-
vestment should cover as mentioned before, bordering the fiscal "consump-
tive expenditure", and is the domain of public investment to be made at 
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the cost of the general accounts of the government budget. 
The scope of (C) has not directly to do with public investment and. 
therefore it may be questionable to list it on the table and yet it has mea-
ning in that these civilian enterprises are directly related to the projects of 
(D) and (B) (public projects, and other government projects). 
While the relations between (C) and (B) (D) are as such, there are also 
co-relations between (A) and (B), (B) and (D), as well as between (A) and 
(D). The key industries of (A) could be nationalized, while the civilian 






Table (9) The fields of public investment 
Civilian enterprises 
(A) 
Key industries (Electric, 
Iron & Steel. Shipbuilding. 
etc.) 





and other industries relat. 






phone & Telegram, Power 




Roads, harbours, land & 
river conservation, Recon. 
struction of natural disast-
ers. Housing, city-const-
ruction, Land-building for 
industrial use. Development 
of irrigation and industrial 
water 
Talking about the relations between (B) and (D), "administrative invest-
ment is also made in (B), while if the public projects of (D) is operated 
in a form of enterprise, it approaches (B). 
Particularly when a category such as "quasi. public enterprise" be esta-
blished for the projects performed by local public bodies, and if a self-sup-· 
porting accounting system be imposed thereon, such projects as local water-
supply, improvement of harbour facilities, hospitals, markets, butchery and 
even the turist industry could be placed under the scope of (B). 
Looking into the relations between (A) and (D), some enterprises among 
the key industries of (A) having comparatively high capital accumulation 
can independently or in co-operation with the construction enterprise of (C) 
as a joint venture carry out the projects such as the improvement of har-
bour facilities, ground-construction for industry and the development of 
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industrial water supply etc. belonging to the category of (D). 
These co-relations serve to our recognition that some projects which are 
supposed to be handled as government program or government enterprises 
because they are considered as social capital or social expenditure, corne 
under the capital cost of the monopoly enterprise. Hence there arises the 
problem of the identification of each of and co-relations between "the social 
capital" and "production capital". 
The conception of these terms are also very obscure. If the word of 
key industry means the enterprises having the nature of social gross capital 
that are inherently brought into being by the socialization of productive 
power, the civilian and government enterprises belonging to the categories 
of (A) and (B) will be worthy of being called social capital. However, ac-
cording to the "Income Doubling Program ", (B) and (D) seem to be called 
"social capital" in the sense that the social indirect capital is equivalent to 
the social overhead-cost, where there is a new view-point from which the 
investment of "the social capital" (public investment) is taken as the ca-
pital coefficient against the national economy or as the material balance for 
the national gross products. 
This is a new theoretical and systematic approach to the problem of 
public investment and should be duly appreciated in that such way of gras-
ping the issue has never been attempted so far and that thus it constitutes 
a characteristic feature of the "Income Doubling Program ". 
However in reality, public investment is not guided by the" Program". 
In the course of the elevation of the industrial structure entailed by the 
competition of industrial investment among the monopolistic enterprises of 
(A), the public investment cannot but assume the function to reduce the 
capital coefficient or to share the capital cost of the monopolistic enterprises. 
This is the basic feature cornmon to all the public investments of (A) (B) 
and (D). 
When such feature of public investment is admitted to exist, what is 
meant by "social capital"? We should say that by and large, it is the 
"social expenditure" to be catered for by the "administrative investment" 
of (D), as it has a feature of "industrial investment" that improves the 
productive power of the monopolistic enterprise but it is inherently a social 
" expenditure ". (Reference; K. W. Cup, Private enterprise and social 
expenditure) With the premise of the explanation as to the Table of "the 
fields of public investment" as given above, let US make analysis of the 
public investment in the fields of (A) (B) and (D) of the Japanese national 
economy. Here, however, though the public investment in the agriculture 
and forestry as well as in medium-small enterprises of (A) bears great im-
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portance for the elevation of the industrial structure, it is left out because 
of the limitation of the space of this papers, while the analysis on the "ad-
ministrative investment" is to be made just as far as it is necessary. 
In the process of an intense industrial investment that has been made 
since 1955, the capital coefficient of the monopolistic enterprises or the new 
development industries has come to rise sharply. Though the rise of capital 
coefficient is an inevitable phenomenon when the economy is picking up, 
or during the elevation of the industrial structure but since the capital coe-
fficient is the reciprocal of the output coefficient, the rise of capital coeffici-
ent has two effects; the one is that brings pressure on the current earning 
power of the enterprise and the other that entails over-productive capacity 
·of the enterprise in the future. 
Let us see actual situation of the rise of capital coefficient in the heavy 
.and chemical industries. 
Table (10) Marginal capital coefficient of the principal industries 
1955-57 1956-58 1957-59 
~---. 
Manufacturing Ind. 0.91 1.23 
Iron & Steel 0.54 1.55 
Chern. Ind. (except fertilizer) 1.68 2.48 
General machines 0.30 0.38 
Electric machines 0.60 0.55 
Textile O.BO 2.88 
Elect. power 7.53 9.80 
Remarks: Marginal capital coefficient 
Increment of tangible fixed asset 
Increment of added value 








Among them, iron & steel and chemical industries have seen consistent 
rise of the capital coefficient. As to the former it is understood that the 
modernization investment and the expenditure for the ground-building, etc. 
are included, while the construction cost for the consolidation of, particularly, 
petrochemical industry must be covered by the latter. 
Now regarding the power industry, the highest capital coefficient has 
been maintained, while slow but gradual rise as to the general machine 
industries during this period must not be overlooked, because this branch of 
industry is given a pivotal position in the "Income Doubling Program" 
and also because it is in this industry that 5,500 billion yen worth of invest-
ment is scheduled to be made for more specialiZation and scaling up. 
As already pointed out, the rise of capital coefficient is a reflection of 
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·the brisk investment for the modernization as well as for the technological 
innovation, and therefore it promises the elevation of industrial structure and 
·the increase of productive power in the future. However, at the same time, 
it could be taken as an indication of rapid rise of the price of land as well 
as rent accompanied by the keen competition for land securement as seen 
in the case of plant erection or enlargement and of the ground-building for 
the industrial use. 
Again when it is viewed from the cost angle, such rise of capital 
coefficient tells as the rise of the cost of getting finance entailed by the 
competition for barrowing capital necessary for the procurement of long-
term fixed assets. 
Thus the rise of capital cost including the rise of the price of land, 
rent and the monetary interest constitute a minus factor against the elevation 
of the industrial structure, and it will tend to make the high growth of 
industry drift toward inflation. 
Naturally, in order to cope with the increase of capital cost as mentioned 
above, the monopolistic enterprises sometimes put their management together, 
sometimes divide it further, or tie-up with financial institutes for the for-
mation of an integrated organization for the procurement of capital and 
they give impetus to the public investment. 
Particularly the centralized organization for the procurement of necessary 
'funds including that of the public investment as described in the previous 
chapter of "Regional Dis:::repancy and Regional concentration of Economic 
Power" is the most salient feature of the process of high rate economic 
growth after the war. This is therefore worthy of re-examination from the 
standpoint of the financial market, but because of the limited space, the 
problem of public investment in the key industries alone is studied here in 
connection with the industrial structure, referring now to power as well as 
iron and steel industries where the capital coefficient is extremely high and 
its rising rate is sharp as given in the table (9). 
Needless to say that the weight of the public investment in these two 
branches of industry is high. For example, the projects of power-source 
·development that require the highest capital cost, is being handled by the 
Fower-Source Development Company whose capital is invested 99% by the 
government. On the other hand nine power companies are enjoying their 
business in the perfect regional monopoly. 
Compared with power industry, the iron steel industry is much closer 
in its pattern to the civilian enterprise but the fact remains that the two 
large companies of Yahata and Fuji are the offshoots of "Nittetsu ", the 
·company incorporated for national policy, and they are still maintaining the 
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special degree of concentration of capital and production. 
The very fact that the power as well as iron and steel companies have-
stood out in between other key civilian industries and the public enterprises 
as special type of enterprises of large scale and that they have monopolized 
the lion's share of the public investment reveals that the concentration 
level of the capital and production of our key industries is still low and 
their present degree of cartel and monopoly involves weakness. It is, 
however, noteworthy that there is a sign that these companies are recently 
moving to form up combinates with chemical and machine industries in the 
face of domestic and international competitions, as a new form of monopoly. 
(S. Uchida: Inconsistency between the elevation of Japanese heavy and 
chemical industries and the large scale enterprises, Keizai Hyoron, Nov. 
issue, 1960). 
The relative weakness of the monopoly in Japan (from the international 
viewpoint), as mentioned above, also reveals itself in the problem of mono-
poly price. In Japan, as often pointed out, there is no administered price 
as typically seen in the United States. The phenomenon that the monopoly 
price has little effect of "downward rigidity" in the time of economic 
recession implies the above. However, the obsecurity of the borderline 
between the key civilian industries and the public enterprises as explained 
above, or rather its continuity is implicitly telling us that there is, in our 
country a peculiar type of administered price such as public fees, and that 
they are supposed to be supplementing the monopoly price. 
Our public fees show" a peculiar cheapness" but in the current process. 
of high growth, its rising speed indicates "a peculiar rapidity". I cannot 
afford to make further analysis on the public fees here, the mutually supple-
mentary function between the key industries and the public enterprises will 
be clarified in the following chapter from the side of public enterprise. 
V. Capital Cost in Public Enterprises 
The term of public enterprise as used here means such enterprise as 
operated by the government or by the local public bodies, taking care of 
the domain of (B) of the table (9) indicating the fields of public investment 
where the close relations between (B) and (A) (D) are taken for granted. 
First of all, it must be noted that the position and the function of the 
public enterprises are subject to change as the industrial structure will be 
progressively reorganized. When people hear" public enterprise" or " public 
utility enterprise", they are apt to think that these enterprises are something 
that serve to the interests of the public in general or to the benefit of the 
consumers. 
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It is because of such preoccupied idea that said enterprises are sometime 
"called "service industry" or treated as belonging to the category of tertiary 
industry. However, even in case they are made to fall under the scope of 
service industry, it should be entirely wrong if the rise of the hair-cut fee 
of barbar-shop and that of the fare of the National Railways are treated 
together simply as the problem of "service fee". 
At the lower stage of industrial structure it was not necessarily wrong 
if the public enterprises were regarded as those rendering service mainly to 
the interests of the people in general. However, as the industrial structure 
undergoes progressive reorganization, it gradually deepens its relations with 
the heavy and chemical industries through the output and input of the 
public enterprises, or the raw materials that the latter purchases and the 
products or services it supplies to the former and thus the public enterprises 
have come to assume the feature inherent to the heavy or chemical industries. 
There are many examples showing such tendency. 
Our national railways had long been managed with the business principle 
of "passengers first" (the income of passenger fares preferred to freight) 
but since during the war it has become "a main artery of industrial trans-
portation". Talking about the power companies which are close in its nature 
to the public enterprise, their power-supply ratio was once one part for 
lighting purpose and three parts for industrial power at the beginning of 
Showa era (ca. 35 years ago) and so it was also right after the war, but at 
present said proportion changed to I: 5. The largest industrial consumer 
of electric power toward the end of Taisho era was traffic industry followed 
by the textile industry and chemical industry in that order, namely the 
power was mainly consumed for service or for the production of consumer 
goods. Today the principal consumers are chemical and metal industries 
while the weight of traffic and textile industries has fallen far below. Maybe 
it is a little too specific but it was in the middle of Taisho era when the 
industrial salt gained more importance over the salt for food, and particul-
arly after the Manchurian Incident when chemical industry had rapidly 
expanded, the monopoly sale of salt was shifted from that of the monopoly 
of state finance to that of the public service monopoly. 
Such tendency has all the more accelerated in the current process of 
the elevation of the industrial structure, and the public enterprises (public 
corporations in local areas) have come to be involved in this trend more 
extensively. 
Take for instance, water-supply enterprise operated by local public 
-corporation has come to cater for the increasing demand of industrial water, 
while the same is true with the enterprise of power development as well as 
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of town-gas supply operated by the local public corporation. In the field 
of gas-supply, the local corporation is consolidating its ties with iron & steel 
industry for the utilization of off-gas of blast furnace and of coke-oven gas. 
The above examples indicate that the public corporation itself is being 
dragged into serving the heavy and chemical industries. 
Hence the public enterprise itself is subject to the influence of the law 
of "investment calls for another investment" in its relations with monopo-
listic key-industries, and thus it comes to share the burden of capital cost 
of the monopoly business enterprises. In a broader sense, the capital cost 
or over-head cost covers also the sales promotion cost, financial cost and 
the part of transportation cost, most of which are the reflection of the lack 
of planning for the current economic growth and the excessive competition 
among monopolies, and thus the burden of these costs are taken care of by 
the public traffic and communication corporations. 
It is well known that to meet the daily and seasonal traffic rush of 
the commuters and the passengers, the traffic enterprises have to maintain 
enormous amount of fixed assets which bring financial pressure upon its 
business management. 
In Japan large-size buses are running through narrow roads, while 
dump-trucks are damaging them. All of these are urging to make "admin-
istrative investment." The rise in the cost of sales promotion such as of 
propaganda or advertisement gives rise to the specialization of such enterprise· 
that takes over these costs which are, in many cases, shared in Japan by 
the public communication corporations. 
What effect has then been brought about by the change of the nature 
of the public enterprises and their relations with industries particularly those 
with the monopolistic industrial groups upon the capital and financial stru-
ctures of public corporations, is to be further studied here. Of course I 
am not dealing with all sorts of public corporations in this limited papers 
but would forcus my thought only to the local corporations that most 
typically indicate the inconsistency of the public enterprise in the process 
of high economic growth. Similar to the case of private power and tran-
sportation enterprises, the ratio of the fixed assets in the total assets of the 
public corporations generally goes beyond or around 90 %. 
Local public corporations are not exception to this. Particularly in 
such local public corporation as operating the power or water-supply has 
such ratio as 93.7% for the former and 92.9 % for the latter. 
This is the very rcason why they have to be operated as public enter-
prise for which public investment must be made. Now, however, the public 
enterprises have to enlarge the equipment in concert with the rapid civilialL 
THE INCOME DOUBLING PROGRAM AND PUBLIC INVESTMEKT 47 
industrial investment because of the industrial co-relations existing between 
them. On the other hand, while the investment of local public corporations 
had been restricted to the minimum during and after the war and thus 
their equipment had long been left obsolete they have suddenly been made 
to face a great necessity to either construct or modernize the equipment to 
cope with the plant construction, concentration of population, urbanization 
of local area etc. since 1955. 
When this is reviewed from financial structure, it means the increase 
of long-term fixed assets, of construction and modernization cost, and in 
turn the augmentation of the project bonds of local public corporation. 
The weight of the local project bonds in the program of public financial 
investment and loaning of the government is on the increase and as the 
matter of fact, the ratio of the project bonds of local public corporations 
in its local bonds program has expanded from 24.0% in 1955 to 52.0% in 
1960 outweighing the local bonds of general accounting and those of the 
direct state projects. 
N ow, the problem of capital coefficient or capital cost in the local 
public corporations presents itself here as that of the project bonds or 
interest burden and that of the redemption cost. Even as to the subscription 
of the public project bonds by the funds of the post office life insurance 
and the Funds Operation Bureau of the government, its terms and conditions 
get less favorable on the part of the local public corporations as compared 
with that of pre-war days. Besides, in the case of the bonds of public 
corporation, more and more of them have come to be placed on the open 
market for subscription in competition with the same financial source that 
tends to go direct into the private investment. 
In the case of the government funds, the interest rate to be paid 
thereto is 6.5% per annum with redemption period of 25 years, but for 
public bonds placed on the open market, the interest rate is 7.6% with 
redemption terms of 7 years, while the durable years of the fixed assets are 
in the case of water-supply projects are set approximately over 55 years, 
and those of electric power generation and distribution over 40 years. 
In case of the public corporations, the project bonds must be redeemed 
from the depreciation, and there are instances where the burden of monetary 
interests and the cost of refunding the project bonds far exceed the depre-. 
clatlOns. Under such circumstances, it comes to be necessitated to have the 
excessive part of the financial cost which can not afford to be covered by 
the depreciation included in public fee. That is to say, the investment in 
the construction or equipment modernization cannot be catered for by the 
local bonds but by the raising of the public fee. To be more exact, since 
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the necessary funds for the construction as the modernization projects cannot 
be covered only by the local bonds (bonds placed on the open market), the 
public fees have to be raised. 
Such situation is made clear by looking into the table (II) where the 
transition of the capital account of the local public corporation is given. 
Table (11) Balance of Payments of Capital Accounts 
of the Local Public Corporations 
1953 1954 1955 1956 
Capital Income 14,447 17,619 20,234 25,361 
Project bonds (A) 12,737 15,981 18,010 21,836 
Subsidy 371 319 422 456 
Allotment for the cost of 370 251 254 401 
construction work 
Others 969 1,068 1,548 2,668 
Capital Expenditure 22,580 27,378 29,195 39,924 
Const. & Remodelling cost(B) 20,756 23,435 23,289 32.652 
Redemption of Liability (C) 1,313 2.375 4,009 5,245 
Others 511 1,568 1,897 2,027 
Balance -8,133 -9,759 -8,961 -14,563 
A 
l3 xlOO 62% 680/0 77% 67% 
C 
A xlOO 10% 15% 22% 24% 
(K. Yamano: Curent stuation and its analysir of the Public Enterprises) 
From this table alone, the relations between the necessary funds and 
the income of public fees are not made necessarily clear but it can be 
roughly inferred that the gap between the income by project bonds and 
the cost of construction and modernization work is comparatively large, and 
that the ratio of the cost of redemption of the liability as against the income 
by project bonds is persistently rising year after, thus the shortage of funds 
to be allocated to the construction and the modernization work is bringing 
more pressure upon the income by the public fees. 
On the other hand, in the case of industrial investment of the key 
industries of private sector too, the weight of the cost of barrowed capital 
or financial cost is large, and this is said to be constituting a handicap of 
the Japanese economy in the international competition. However, it must 
not be overlooked that the gigantic profit that stands high above the inter-
national level is still existent for the private industries, which is entirely non-
·existent in the case of the public corporations. 
The burdens of capital cost and financial cost of the public corporations 
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-directly affect the enterprises themselves which in turn oppress the people 
in general. 
Moreover, when a part of the capital and financial costs of the key 
industries of private sector (monopolistic business) is considered to be borne 
-by the public investment and public enterprises to reinforce the high degree 
growth, it makes us skeptical as to who is eventually supporting whose 
growth. 
Thus it is obvious that what is meant by the Schema of the Income 
Doubling Program, the social capital (public investment) = capital coefficient 
,or the material balance of the national productive power. 
VI. Theory of the Planning of Public InvestJnent 
The Schema of "the public investment=capital coefficient of national 
-economy", is a new viewpoint of "Doubling Program" by which how 
much of public investment is necessary for the growth of so and so % of 
national income, is estimated, thus to systematically control the public 
investment. 
However since the current public investment is actually being made 
subject to the investment competition among the private industrial groups, 
it is highly skeptical how far it can exercise said control. In fact" Doubling 
. Program " determines the amount of investment based on the balance of 
"saving=investment ", and this is presenting another controlling method of 
allocating the said amount to the various domains of public investment. 
There is no denying that the public investment will contribute to 
solidifying the foundations of the productive power constituting itself an 
integral part of such power, but in reality, it is usually made, after the 
various troubles and confusions as well as inconsistencies have actually taken 
place due to the insufficiency of public investment, for the purpose of 
straightening out the chaotic state of economic life and the confusion of 
social life brought about by the competition among the monopolistic business 
groups as the result of anarchical industrial investment that brings about 
unsystematic increase of productive power. 
Here lies the aspect of the public investment which is to be regarded 
as social capital or as sharing the social cost rather than as productive 
capital. Again this is the very reason why the public investment is expected 
to play a role of demand-creating function or of narrowing the gap of the 
unbalance between the production and consumption, rather than the role 
-of creating the productive power. With the background as stated above, 
the public investment tends to be unsystematic and becomes an overlapping 
investment being involved in the competition among the monopoly groups, 
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rather than fulfilling its original mission of leading the economic growth 
into a well-balanced form. 
Though the public investment is placed within the framework of public 
credit and the state finance, the very fact that it is supported by such 
public credit and the state finance opens up the way to the danger of 
making capricious investment. 
Such danger is obviously recognized in the expansion of the public 
investment. 
Now, the" Income Doubling Program" regards the" Proper distribution 
of industries by the public investment" as the "basic measures to reform 
the constitution or structure of our national economy". (Explanation: 
Page 53) 
This must be the policy objective to be realized through "Doubling 
Program" that is entrusted with the correction of the dual structure of our 
national economy. 
It must therefore be brought home that in this domain of policy, the 
public investment as really worthy of being a policy must be established 
versus that tends to be dragged into the complication of civilian investments, 
though the greatest difficulty is anticipated ahead thereof. 
The planning of the proper distribution of industries is, so to speak, to· 
shape up a new industrial foundations and in a sense, it is a plan of regionaL 
development. However the private capitals will not readily trust the go-
vernment plan even when they are suffering an excessive concentration of 
industry in which they find themselves. 
A spokesman of a large iron & steel maker said as follows: 
" ...... it is urgent matter for each enterprise to secure new plant 
locations in concert with the industrial expansion and we can hardly wait 
for the completion of the public facilities related to the industries (the plan 
of proper distribution of industries by the public investment). Therefore 
from the standpoint of the civilian industries, though there is no objection 
whatsoever to the idea of improved distribution of industrial locations, we 
would request, besides such long-term counter-measures, the urgent consider-
ation of the government to reasonable solve the problems soonest possible 
such as the improvement of harbour facilities and transportation of the 
area where many enterprises are actually planning to move in, of securing 
the industrial water supply, of expediting the conversion of farming land 
to plant site, prevention of price rise of land and the solution of the in-
demnification of fishery, the trickiest problem of the enterprises concerned.'" 
(Nippon Keizai Shinbun, Nov. 29) 
Here too the private capitals are asking for the public investment that. 
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subordinates to the private investment rather than the structural policy 
through public investment. 
Thus the public investment concentrates itself to the area where the 
private investments are concentratedly made. The examination of the' 
process of high economic growth so far made, tells this, and the table (12) 
also supports such trend. 
Table (12) The transition of the ratio of public investment made in the 4 largest 
industrial areas as against that made throughout the nation. 









Remarks: (I) 4 big industrial areas include Tokyo metropolis, Kanagawa, 
Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, Fukuoka prefectures. 
(2) Figures of 1956, 1957 and 11958 are taken from Economic 
~l'hite Papers while the average of 1947-1949 is referred 
to "Economic Stablilization Board: Table of distribution of 
public project expenditure classified according to prefectures." 
(3) Public investments of 1947-1949 are those made in production, 
traffic, landwconservation, people's welfare facilities, while after 
1956 are those made in conservation of rivers, road construction, 
city pianmng, public housing project, harbour facilities. 
The said trend is not only supported by the fact but also from the 
planning theory based on "public investment=the material balance of na-
tional gross products ", it must be so. 
How such regional concentration of public investment and in turn the 
augmented concentration of private investment in such region can be cor-· 
rected and how a reasonable distribution of public investment can be 
materialized? This is the problem of public investment that has greatly to 
do with the development of underdeveloped area, conservation of soil, 
mountain, and also with irrigation project, etc., but in this point the theory 
of "Doubling Program" is remaining obscure, though it has distribution 
standard anyway in a form of "standard formula of investment efficiency." 
This is a formula by which the size of economic investment being 
enough to protect the amount of assets in a given area (in case of the 
public investment in land conservation, it is the amount of possible damage 
by natural calamity) is estimated in reference to the marginal capital co-
efficient of road construction and harbour facilities projects, since this sort 
of public investment can not be regarded as a positive factor that elevates 
GNP as that made in the construction of the highway and port facilities. 
In another words, such type of flood having a probability of happening 
only once in 100 years may do a great damage if it actually comes, but if 
an investment be made to perfectly protect the area from such slimly 
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.anticipated flood, the yearly investment efficiency will sharply decline. 
Therefore, if the income standard in the area be elevated, the damage 
therein will be yearly larger, and thus the investment efficiency will be 
improved to the point where the public investment comes to be economically 
justified. (Explanation: 63-64 page) Though this way of thinking may 
.look quite reasonable, it is but an other side of the same idea of "public 
investment=material balance of GNP ". 
The efforts to try to place the distribution of public investment of 
Income Doubling Program on the standard which can be scientifically cal-
culated, freeing it from the pressure of lobbyist or of the political parties 
should be duly appreciated, because here lies a sign of the break from the 
conventionalism of the conservative politics. However this program has 
proved itself to be having all the policy standards and therefore the economic 
standard of public investment conformed to the growth of national produ-
ction or that of the productive power of the large enterprises. Thus the 
question remains if such program could develop the under-developed areas 
that locate outside of the so-called "the belt alongside the Pacific Coast". 
Originally, since no active public investments will be made in the 
underdeveloped areas, the private investments will not be introduced thereto 
and the standard of income in such area will be remaining low. Then 
since the income level there is low, neither the public investment, nor 
civilian investments will positively made in such underdeveloped area. This 
is a vicious cycle of poverty as pointed out by Ragnar N urkse (Problems 
-of capital formation in underdeveloped countries). 
However the vicious cycle of "under-developed countries are poor 
because they are poor" as mentioned by N urkse is nothing but the reverse 
.side of the law of capital accumulation of "the developed areas are wealthy 
becanse they are wealthy." 
The "Doubling program" and the theory of its public investment 
based on the law of accumulation seems now to have fallen into the vicious 
-cycle. 
